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CURRENT ANTITRUST PROBLEMS
IN BROADCASTING
RicHARD L. PERRY*
The purpose of this article is to summarize recent developments
which involve antitrust problems in the broadcast industry. The in-
dustry is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission and
consists principally of AM and FM radio and television. The television
segment of the industry is subdivided into very-high frequency stations
(VHF) and ultra-high frequency stations (UHF).' Recent develop-
ments involving antitrust problems have largely centered on the tele-
vision segment of the industry. This fact probably reflects that me-
dium's rapidly growing social and economic importance. Television
broadcasting currently reaches 52 million households, or 92 percent
of the 57 million households in the United States. The average family
spends slightly more than 44 hours per week viewing television, and
surveys indicate that television has replaced newspapers as the public's
primary source of news.2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 313 of the Communications Act of 1934 provides:
All laws of the United States relating to unlawful restraints
and monopolies and to combinations, contracts, or agreements in
* Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia.
1 The VHF channels are numbered 2 through 13. The UHF channels are numbered
14 through 83. For a number of years, UHF stations have been at a competitive disad-
vantage primarily because the majority of existing television receivers were not equipped
to receive UHF signals. This competitive disadvantage will be gradually corrected as a
result of the All-Channel Act, which went into effect on April 30, 1964. 76 Stat. 150
(1962), 47 U.S.C § 303(s) (1964); 76 Stat. 151 (1962), 47 U.S.C. § 330 (1964); 47
C.F.R. §§ 15.65, 15.66 (1965). With a television receiver turnover of approximately
10% per year, the "saturation" of UHF reception will approach 100% in approximately
ten years from the effective date of the Act. The history of the Commission's attempts
to resolve competitive problems confronting UHF broadcasters is summarized in Note,
75 Harv. L. Rev. 1578 (1962).
2 See Address by Commissioner Loevinger, Colorado Broadcasters Association,
June 11, 1965.
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restraint of trade are declared to be applicable to... interstate or
foreign radio communications.3
The Supreme Court has declared that "the field of broadcasting is
one of free competition."4 The Court further said:
Plainly it is not the purpose of the Act to protect a licensee
against competition but to protect the public. Congress intended to
leave competition in the business of broadcasting where it found it,
to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with other
broadcasters to survive or succumb, according to his ability to make
his programs attractive to the public.5
Although the broadcast industry is thus one of "free competition,"
the primary responsibility for enforcing the antitrust laws does not
reside in the Federal Communications Commission, but in the De-
partment of Justice and other agencies such as the Federal Trade Com-
mission.' The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Communica-
tions Commission has no direct authority to pass on antitrust violations
as such.7
The Commission's licensing functions are governed by a standard
of "public convenience, interest, or necessity."' The fact that the
Commission has no direct authority to enforce the antitrust laws, how-
ever, does not imply that it may not consider federal antitrust policy
in determining whether the "public convenience, interest, or necessity"
will be served by granting a license? For example, the Supreme Court
3 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 313(a) (1964).
4 FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
5 Id. at 475.
6 Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21
(1964), gives the Federal Communications Commission authority to enforce the Act's
prohibitions of price discrimination, mergers, and interlockng directorates "where ap-
plicable to common carriers engaged in wire or radio communication or radio transmis-
sion of energy." The Commission, however, has never exercised its authority under this
section. Several of the antitrust laws may be inapplicable to practices of the broadcast
industry. Thus, it has been held that the sale of broadcast time is not a "commodity"
within the meaning of the Clayton Act. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962). But
cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609-10 n.27 (1953);
Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1956). See Blake
& Blum, "Network Television Rate Practices: A Case Study of the Failure of Social
Control of Price Discrimination," 74 Yale LJ. 1339 (1965), Loevinger, "The Role of
Government in the Field of Advertising," 26 ABA Section of Antitrust Law Proceedings
180 (1964).
7 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
8 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964).
9 United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 222-24 (1943).
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has held that in the field of international radiotelegraphy, competition
is not an unqualified goal but merely "a relevant factor in weighing the
public interest."'" In addition, the Commission has held that it is with-
out power to consider the possible effects of lawful competition, as dis-
tinguished from unlawful restraints and monopolies, when passing on
broadcast applications." The Commission's policies in promoting com-
petition seems to be guided basically by first amendment principles,
and are apparently directed more toward achieving the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
than they are toward promoting competition in the commercial sense.'
If the Commission has no authority to enforce the antitrust laws,
does a satisfactory system of liaison exist between the Commission
and the antitrust enforcement agencies?
LIAISON WITH ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee has described
liaison arrangements between the Federal Communications Commission
and the Department of Justice as "inadequate."' 3 Recent develop-
ments in the protracted litigation involving certain broadcast stations
owned by the National Broadcasting Company and the Westinghouse
Broadcasting Company bear this out. 4
10 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953).
11 Southeastern Enterprises (WCLE), 13 Pike & Fischer Radio Regulation (here-
inafter cited as R.R.] 139, 147 (1957). See Note, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1036 (1957); Note,
67 Yale LJ. 135 (1957). The Commission, however, must consider economic injury to a
competitor if the public interest in the maintenance of adequate service would be
affected by granting a license. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir.
1958). As a general rule, the antitrust laws are designed to protect competition, not
individual competitors. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
12 See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Goodwill Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 325 F.2d
637, 640 n_5 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
'3 Celler, "Antitrust Problems in the Television Broadcast Industry," 22 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 549, 555-57 (1957).
14 In 1955 NBC owned VHF television stations in New York City, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Cleveland, and Washington, D.C., the nation's first, second, third, tenth, and
eleventh largest markets. Westinghouse was the licensee of VHF stations in Philadelphia,
Boston, and San Francisco and was an applicant for stations in Pittsburgh and Portland,
Oregon. Westinghouse's Philadelphia and Boston stations were affiliated with the NBC
network.
NBC desired to exchange its stations in Cleveland and Washington, the tenth and
eleventh largest markets, for stations located in more important markets, i.e., Philadelphia
and Boston, the fourth and sixth largest markets. NBC offered to trade its Cleveland and
Washington stations for Westinghouse's Philadelphia and Boston stations and advised
Westinghouse that if the trade could not be consummated, it would attempt to pur-
chase other stations in Philadelphia and Boston. Westinghouse inferred from this that
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In 1955 Westinghouse agreed to exchange its Philadelphia stations
for NBC's Cleveland station plus 3 million dollars, and NBC offered
network affiliation to Westinghouse for its proposed Pittsburgh station.
The parties requested approval of the arrangement by the Commission.
After conducting an investigation, but without a full hearing, the Com-
mission approved the transaction in December 1955.
A year later, the Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust
suit charging that NBC's conduct in arranging the exchange was in
violation of the Sherman Act. The Department of Justice and NBC
stipulated that the Commission had before it all the information which
constituted the basis of the government's complaint.15 The case was
settled by a consent judgment which required NBC to divest its
Philadelphia stations. In compliance with the judgment, NBC entered
an agreement with RKO General, Inc., a licensee of stations in Boston,
under which NBC would exchange its Philadelphia properties for
RKO General's Boston stations. Both the Department of Justice and
the district court indicated that the proposed assignment would not be
inconsistent with the consent decree.16
When NBC's Philadelphia licenses came up for renewal before
the Commission, Philco Broadcasting Company filed a competing ap-
plication. In addition to this controversy between NBC and Philco,
the Commission was also required to approve the arrangements be-
tween NBC and RKO General. The Commission conducted extensive
hearings into all transactions between NBC and Westinghouse. Follow-
ing these hearings, the Commission ordered NBC to exchange its
Philadelphia stations for Westinghouse's Cleveland stations, without
returning the 3 million dollars which had been paid to Westinghouse.17
The Philco application was denied. The Commission said: "We deem
those facts to demonstrate that NBC acquired the licenses of stations
WRCV-TV and WRCV(AM) in Philadelphia through the coercive
use of its power to grant or withhold network affiliations."' 3
With respect to the consent order which had been approved by the
district court, the Commission said:
The consent decree involves antitrust matters resting solely within
the discretion and competence of the courts .... We, on the other
hand, must determine whether, under the Communications Act, re-
it would lose network affiliation in Philadelphia and Boston if it refused to trade with
NBC. Entering Boston and Philadelphia would place NBC in the first, second, third,
fourth, and sixth (now the fifth) largest markets.
1; United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 338 (1959).
16 United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 186 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
17 National Broadcasting Co., 2 R.R.2d 921 (1964).
18 Id. at 935.
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newal of the Philadelphia licenses and their transfer to RKO Gen-
eral would serve the public interest. We cannot regard this transac-
tion, which in exchange would bring to NBC the present RKO
General licenses in Boston, as one which meets the public interest.
For the ownership of stations in Boston (in the event that Westing-
house refused to exchange the Philadelphia stations) was, as stated,
one of the prime objects of the very misconduct which the public
interest requires us to prevent and deter.19
Thus, the NBC-Westinghouse case indicates that Commission
approval of a transaction will not necessarily prevent the Department
of Justice from seeking remedies under the antitrust laws. Corre-
spondingly, a district court judgment which permits a transaction satis-
fying the antitrust laws will not necessarily deter the Commission from
reexamining the entire transaction and directing a different result in
accordance with its own policies. In this case, a transaction which had
been approved by the Commission was later challenged by the De-
partment and a transaction approved by the Department was later
challenged by the Commission. The Commission also disapproved a
transaction which it itself had approved nine years earlier. It is appar-
ent that the differing policies pursued by the Department of Justice
under the antitrust laws and by the Commission under the "public
interest" standard are capable of producing an uneven enforcement
of the law.
LICENSING PROCEEDINGS
The Commission's Uniform Policy on Law Violations
The Communications Act empowers the Commission to promul-
gate regulations requiring applicants to disclose facts concerning their
"citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifica-
tions.' 20 The Commission's 1951 Uniform Policy on Law Violations
sets forth standards for licensing proceedings in which it appears that
an applicant has violated federal, state, or local laws.21
The "Uniform Policy" makes it clear that the Commission does
not intend to enforce the antitrust laws, as such. However, the Com-
mission will consider violations of the antitrust laws to the extent that
they reflect upon an applicant's qualifications to serve as a licensee.2
19 Id. at 947.
20 48 Stat. 1084 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1964).
21 Dkt. No. 9572, FCC 51-317, March 29, 1951.
22 In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 222 (1943), the
Court held that the Commission may exercise its judgment to determine whether viola-
tions of the antitrust laws disqualify an applicant, and may "infer from the fact that
the applicant had in the past tried to monopolize radio, or had engaged in unfair methods
of competition, that the disposition so manifested would continue and that if it did it
would make him an unfit licensee."
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The Commission said that it will consider whether the violation was
willful or inadvertant, whether there was merely an isolated instance
of violation as distinguished from a series of recurring offenses which
establish a definite pattern of misconduct, whether the violations have
taken place over a long period of time, and whether the applicant is
presently engaged in illegal practices.
The Commission said that although the "Uniform Policy" is
not confined to violations of the antitrust laws, violations of those laws
"have been the principal basis for the Commission's concern in this
matter." 3 In particular, the Commission was concerned about "the
major motion picture companies who have violated the antitrust laws
over a period of years in the motion picture field." 4
Several motion picture companies whose applications for broad-
cast facilities were pending before the Commission had been defendants
in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.25 In that case, the Su-
preme Court held that a number of motion picture producers, distribu-
tors, and exhibitors had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. The offenses included the fixing of minimum admission prices
which exhibitors could charge; the use of unreasonable clearances
and runs which gave the defendants a monopoly on "first-run" pic-
tures; the joint ownership of theaters by defendants; the employment
of formula deals, master agreements, and franchises which prevented
small exhibitors from obtaining "first-run" films; the "block-booking"
of films, whereby exhibitors were sometimes required to pay for un-
wanted films in order to obtain other films; and the discrimination
against small exhibitors in favor of large theater chains.26
The Commission said that it would proceed on a case-to-case basis
and would review the motion picture companies' records of violations to
determine whether they were qualified to operate in the public interest.
No licenses were revoked or denied, however, as a result of this review.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in the Paramount case, a number
of the defendants have been licensees of radio and television stations.
23 Dkt. No. 9572, supra note 21, at 6.
24 Dkt. No. 9572, supra note 21, at 7.
25 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
26 Some of the defendants in the Paramount case were later defendants in United
States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), in which the Court held illegal the "block-
booking" of films distributed to the television industry.
27 Columbia Pictures Corporation and Screen Gems, Inc. have been licensees of
KCPX-AM and TV, Salt Lake City, Utah since 1959; WAPA-TV, San Juan, Puerto
Rico since 1962. These companies have had a one-third interest in WOLE-TV, Aguadilla,
Puerto Rico since 1962. Twentieth-Century Fox has been the licensee of KMSP-TV,
Minneapolis, Minnesota since 1959. Paramount Pictures, Inc. was the licensee of KTLA-
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In its 1952 decision authorizing the merger of United Paramount
Theaters, Inc. and American Broadcasting Corporation, the Commis-
sion announced several rules which apparently limit the extent to
which it will consider an applicant's history of antitrust violations. 8
The Commission said that no consideration will be given to antitrust
violations occurring more than three years prior to the date the appli-
cation is designated for hearing; actions filed during the three-year
period, if based on antecedent facts, will likewise be ignored; the mere
fact that a complaint is filed during the three-year period, but not
adjudicated, is likewise not relevant;19 and the fact that a case is con-
cluded by means of a settlement agreement, without any finding of
violation, does not reflect adversely upon the applicant."
At the time of the Paramount-ABC merger case, 198 antitrust
cases had been filed against Paramount. Of these, 124 were still pend-
ing, 63 had been settled, 5 had been dismissed, and 4 had been decided
in favor of Paramount. Only two cases had been decided against
Paramount, and one of these was based upon facts antedating the
date of designation by more than three years. This left only one proven
antitrust violation against the applicant.
The Paramount-ABC case, if followed, would limit consideration
of antitrust infractions to those in which the cause of action arose no
more than three years prior to the date of designation of the applica-
tion, and which have been litigated to a conclusion in favor of the
plaintiff. Although the record in FCC cases is frequently open for
several years following the date an application is formally designated
for hearing, the progress of antitrust litigation is often equally slow.
TV in Los Angeles, California from 1947 to 1964. Loews, Inc. was the licensee of WHN
(formerly WMGM) in New York City from 1928 to 1962, and owned a 25% interest
in KMSP-TV, Minneapolis, Minnesota from 1956 to 1958. Warner Brothers was the
licensee of KFWB in Los Angeles, California from 1925 to 1950. A subsidiary of United
Artists Corporation is currently an applicant for two UHF television stations in Houston,
Texas and Lorain, Ohio. Dkt. Nos. 15213, 15248.
28 Paramount Pictures, Inc., 8 R.R. 135 (1952); Paramount Pictures, Inc., 8 R.R.
541 (1952).
20 See also National Broadcasting Co., 15 R.R. 965, 975 (1957); WHDH, Inc.,
13 R.R. 507 (1957); Amalgamated Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 3 R.R. 1176, 1181 (1947);
Television Prods., Inc., 3 R.R. 682 (1946). The Supreme Court, however, has indicated'
that the Commission has the power to refuse a license to a station not operating in the
public interest although its misconduct happens to be an unconvicted violation of the
antitrust laws. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); Asso-
ciated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
30 The Commission has also ruled that an inference of guilt cannot be drawn from
a plea of noto contendere. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 10 R.R. 878, 964-65 (1955).
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The limitations upon inquiry thus imposed by the Paramount-ABC
case would apparently render the "Uniform Policy" inapplicable in
many cases.
In 1961 a number of indictments under the Sherman Act were
filed against leading manufacturers of electrical equipment. At the
same time, officers and employees of certain of these companies were
indicted individually. The indictments charged that the defendants had
unlawfully conspired to fix prices, engaged in collusive bidding, and
divided markets. These practices involved 1.75 billion dollars worth
of electrical equipment. The defendants included Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corporation, which, through subsidiaries, was a licensee of ten
radio stations and four television stations, and General Electric Com-
pany, which owned two radio stations and one television station.31
Westinghouse pleaded guilty in seven cases and nolo contendere in
twelve cases. Eleven of its officers and employees were fined and seven
received prison sentences. General Electric pleaded guilty in seven
cases and nolo contendere in thirteen cases. Fifteen of its officers and
employees were fined and eleven received prison sentences.32
The Commission designated the applications of Westinghouse and
General Electric for hearings to determine what effect, if any, these
antitrust violations had on their qualifications as broadcast licensees.
After lengthy hearings, the Commission renewed all of the Westing-
house and General Electric licenses. The Commission held that anti-
trust violations do not per se disqualify; they are merely circumstances
from which the Commission may draw inferences as to probable future
conduct. It said that the electrical equipment cases did not involve the
same organizational structure which managed and operated the defend-
ants' facilities. Moreover, the record of broadcast performance of both
companies was good, and organizational changes had allegedly been
made to assure that further violations of the antitrust laws would not
occur.
The Commission has generally ruled that violations of the anti-
trust laws are not a disqualifying factor." However, there have been
31 See Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 22 R.R. 1023 (1962); General Elec. Co.,
2 R.R.2d 1038 (1964).
82 Evidence before the Commission indicated that General Electric bad violated the
antitrust laws at least 19 times between 1911 and 1954.
83 General Elec. Co., 2 R.R.2d 1038 (1964); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 22 R.R.
1023 (1962); Lorain journal Co., 9 R.R. 406 (1953); Aladdin Radio and Television,
Inc., 9 R.R. 1, 35 (1953); Paramount Pictures, Inc., 8 R.R. 138 (1952); Lycoming
County Broadcasting Co., 4 R.R. 264, 274-75 (1948).
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at least two comparative hearings in which such violations were among
the grounds cited for preferring one applicant over another.3 4
As a device for maintaining compliance with the antitrust laws
and fostering a national policy of competition in the broadcast industry,
the Commission's "Uniform Policy" has had little apparent effect.
The significance of past violations can often be offset by giving as-
surances of future compliance, by making organizational changes de-
signed to assure that the broadcast facilities will not become involved
in possible future violations, by injunctive provisions adopted by the
court designed to eliminate the recurrence of prohibited conduct,
and by the discharge of officers and employees involved in antitrust
violations. Companies with a record of good performance in areas im-
mediately within the Commission's jurisdiction have rarely been penal-
ized for bad performance in areas under the jurisdiction of the anti-
trust enforcement agencies.
DVERSIFICATION OF CONTROL
When two or more persons file mutually exclusive applications,
the Commission designates the competing applications for a compara-
tive hearing to determine which applicant is best qualified to serve
the public interest.3 5 The award is made on the basis of preferences and
demerits which represent differences among the applicants. The cri-
teria used in comparative hearings include such matters as local
ownership, integration of ownership and management, broadcast ex-
perience, record of past broadcast performance, proposed programming,
participation of officers and stockholders in civic activities, diversifi-
cation of the backgrounds of officers and stockholders, proposed staff
and technical facilities, and diversification of ownership of the media
of mass communications.3 6 Only one of the foregoing criteria-diversi-
fication of ownership of the media of mass communications-involves
a consideration of the probable competitive consequences of a proposed
grant.
The Commission's 1965 "Policy Statement on Comparative Broad-
cast Hearings" states that "diversification is a factor of primary sig-
nificance since.., it constitutes a primary objective in the licensing
scheme. ' m37 The Commission said:
34 Southeastern Mass. Brodcasting Corp., 3 R.R. 1658, 1669 (1947); Arkansas-
Oklahoma Broadcasting Corp., 3 R.R. 479 (1946).
35 Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
36 See Irion, "FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants," 43 Minn. L.
Rev. 479 (1959); Note, 45 Geo. LJ. 265 (1956-57); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (1951).
37 FCC 65-689, July 28, 1965, at 3.
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As the Supreme Court has stated, the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States "rests on the assumption that the wid-
est possible dissemination of information from diverse and antago-
nistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public," Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20. That radio and television
broadcast stations play an important role in providing news and
opinion is obvious. That it is important in a free society to prevent
a concentration of control of the sources of news and opinion and,
particularly, that government should not create such a concentra-
tion, is equally apparent, and well established.38
The Commission ordinarily accords a preference to an applicant
who holds no direct or indirect interest in any media of mass com-
munications. For example, the ownership of broadcast facilities by
persons owning newspapers has been considered in many comparative
hearings and has sometimes been a decisive factor.' In one case, the
Commission denied the application of a newspaper on the ground that
the applicant had used its alleged newspaper monopoly to force a local
radio station out of business. 0 Whether or not the proceeding is a com-
parative one, the Commission generally attempts to determine whether
a grant will result in an undue concentration of control.4
Diversification, however, is only one of a number of factors which
are considered in comparative cases. Depending upon the weight as-
signed to the preferences and demerits on other criteria, diversification
may or may not be controlling. Diversification is not a controlling
factor if it is offset by other criteria.42 On the other hand, it may be
accorded controlling weight if there are no other significant differences
among the competing applicants 43
If the existing and proposed broadcast facilities are located in
widely separated sections of the country and do not compete against
each other for advertising revenues, program materials, or listening
audience, the Commission accords the factor of diversification little
or no weight.44 However, a broadcast interest located in the same re-
gion, although not necessarily in the same community, must be given
38 Id. at 2 n.4.
39 See McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
40 Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See United States
v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959); Miami Broadcast Co., 1 R.R.2d
143, 148 (1963).
41 See Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
42 Tennessee Television, Inc. v. FCC, 262 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
43 See Enterprise Co. v. FCC, 231 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 920
(1956).
44 Peninsula Broadcasting Corp., 18 R.R. 781 (1959).
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comparative consideration. 45 If the existing and the proposed broad-
cast facilities are located in nearby communities so that competition
between them would would be adversely affected, the opposing appli-
cant will be favored.46 The importance of diversification is also reduced
or increased in accordance with the percentage of ownership in the
applicant or in the other mass communication media. However, it
has been held that although the owners of an existing newspaper and
radio station would exercise only a "relatively small voice" in the
applicant, the opposing applicant should be favored.47
RULEMAKING
Community Antenna Television Systems
Community antenna television systems (CATV) receive and am-
plify television broadcast signals and redistribute them by wire or
cable to subscribing members of the public.43 The first commercial
CATV system was installed in 1950. There are now approximately
1,300 CATV systems which serve an estimated 3,300,000 viewers.
Most CATV systems receive television signals as would a home set.
Approximately one-fifth of them, however, employ microwave relays.49
Such relays are subject to the Commission's licensing authority.
For a number of years, television broadcasters have urged the
Commission to impose competitive limits upon CATV systems vis-h-vis
conventional stations. The broadcasters claimed that CATV systems
serve only those who are willing and able to pay fees, whereas conven-
tional broadcasters serve the entire public without charge; they serve
only persons in areas which can support cable systems, and do not
reach many rural areas; they compete unfairly because they distribute
television programs to subscribers without the consent of the originating
station and without bearing any of the program costs; and they al-
legedly do not originate a substantial number of local live programs,
whereas conventional television stations serve local needs and inter-
ests.5o
Until recently, the Commission ruled that it has no jurisdiction
over CATV systems and that there is no basis for regulating the micro-
45 Plains Radio Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
46 Fisher Broadcasting Co., 18 R.R. 369 (1959).
47 Columbia Empire Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 228 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
48 See "Rules re Microwave-Served CATV," 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965) (First Report
and Order). Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 517 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
49 See Address by Commissioner Ford, National Community Television Association,
June 18, 1964.
6o See Address by Commissioner Loevinger, Colorado Broadcasters Association,
June 11, 1965.
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wave common carriers which transmit signals to them.51 An exception
was made, however, where the effect of a grant would result in the
economic destruction of an existing station. 2
On April 22, 1965, the Commission, in effect, reversed its earlier
rulings and announced that it intends to regulate all CATV systems,
whether or not they utilize microwave relays.53 The Commission also
said that it would conduct a broad inquiry into all aspects of CATV
operations. At the same time, the Commission promulgated rules for
CATV systems utilizing microwave relays. The new rules are designed
to protect the competitive position of conventional television stations.
The rules would require CATV systems to carry the signals of local
stations without material degradation in quality. 4 They would also
confer program exclusiveness upon conventional stations by prohibiting
CATV systems from duplicating the programs of local stations, if re-
quested, during a period beginning fifteen days before and ending
fifteen days after the date of broadcast by the local stations.55 In short,
CATV systems would be required not to diminish the potential viewing
audience of local stations and would be prohibited from competing
against their programming.
Another question is whether television broadcast licensees should
be permitted to own CATV systems. Proponents of a rule prohibiting
such ownership base their arguments on the Commission's policy
favoring diversification in the ownership and control of the media of
mass communications. Separately owned television stations and CATV
systems would, arguably, compete more vigorously for viewers than
would facilities owned in common. In addition, a CATV system which
is owned by a television station might discriminate against competing
stations. Licensees might also exploit their CATV system at the expense
of the co-owned television station by failing to broadcast an optimum
technical signal in order to secure greater revenue from the CATV
system.
51 WSTV, Inc. v. Fort Nightly Corp., 23 R.R. 184 (1962); "Inquiry into the Im-
pact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV 'Satellite' Stations, and TV
'Repeaters' on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting," 18 R.R. 1573
(1959); Frontier Broadcasting Co., 16 R.R. 1005 (1958).
52 Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 22 R.R. 193 (1962), aff'd, Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 US. 951 (1963).
53 See "Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking," Dkt. No. 15971,
FCC 65-334, April 22, 1965.
54 In some cases CATV systems do not offer switching devices which enable their
subscribers to receive local stations. It is also alleged that their promotional literature en-
courages subscribers to abandon expensive antenna systems which permit such local
reception.
55 "Rules re Microwave-Served CATV," supra note 48.
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The Commission, however, has reached the "preliminary and
tentative" conclusion that cross ownership should not be prohibited."B
It stated that the evidence has not thus far indicated the existence
of substantial and wide-spread abuses. In addition, it will give further
consideration to the question of cross ownership in its present inquiry
into CATV.
The CATV industry has experienced rapid growth since its in-
ception in 1950. The outlines of some of the problems which have
accompanied this growth can be identified. It is safe to predict, how-
ever, that clarification of these problems and the nature of the Com-
mission's regulatory role will not come for some time.
Network Operations
Television programming comes from four sources: (a) the three
major network corporations, ABC, CBS, and NBC; (b) "syndication,"
which means the distribution of programs originally produced for
television on a non-network regional or local basis; (c) theatrical film
originally produced for motion picture theaters; and (d) local live
programming.5 7
The Commission's regulatory authority over networks is derived
from its licensing functions. Broadcast licensees bear the only direct
legal responsibility for providing radio and television services." A
"network" is composed of a number of independent broadcast licensees
which derive a substantial portion of their programming from a central
source, the network corporation. All three of the major network corpo-
rations are licensees of radio and television stations, although the num-
ber of stations which they can own is limited by the Commission's
multiple ownership rules.
Although network operations present a number of problems having
implications under the antitrust laws,19 recent developments have been
concerned primarily with the role of the networks in the area of pro-
gram production and distribution.
The network corporations procure programs, arrange for sponsor-
ship, and offer a continuous, coordinated program schedule to their
affiliated stations. Networks compensate their affiliates for carrying
network programs and act as "sales agents" to create a national adver-
GO Dkt. No. 15415, FCC 65-688, July 28, 1965 (First Report).
57 See "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking," Dkt. No. 12782, FCC 65-227, March 22,
1965.
58 "Report and Statement of Policy re Commission en banc Programming Inquiry,"
FCC 60-970, July 29, 1960; 25 F.R. 7291, 7295 (1960).
W See, e.g., Salant, Fisher & Brooks, "The Functions and Practices of a Television
Network," 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 584 (1957).
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tising market. The network corporations and their affiliates are con-
nected through common carriers which are required to file tariffs with
the Commission. The type of affiliation contracts which licensees may
execute with the networks is regulated by the Commission's chain
broadcasting regulations, which permit affiliates to reject programs
under certain circumstances.6
In some cases, the networks produce programs and retain all
rights of ownership. In other cases, the networks enter "co-production"
agreements with independent producers. These agreements generally
give the networks a number of rights, including the right to the "first
run" of the program, a share in the profits derived from subsequent
runs, and the right to engage in domestic and foreign syndication. In
other cases network programs are brought to the market by inde-
pendent producers at their own account and risk.
For some time, the Commission has been interested in an alleged
increased control by networks over the production and distribution
of programs. Between 1957 and 1964 the percentage of program hours
accounted for by "independent" producers decreased from approxi-
mately 33 percent to 7 percent.
On March 22, 1965, the Commission announced proposed rules
which would impose strict limitations on the right of networks to own
programs and participate in program production."1 The proposed rules
would also prohibit networks from engaging in the syndication and
foreign sale of programs produced by "independents." The networks,
however, would retain the right to syndicate programs produced solely
by them. The proposed rules would prohibit the networks from offering
a weekly evening program schedule in which more than 50 percent of
the time, or a total of 14 hours per week, whichever is greater, is oc-
cupied by programs (exclusive of news and sustaining programs)
which are produced by the network or in which it has "first run"
rights.
The Commission said that it is not desirable for so few entities to
have such a degree of power with respect to what the American public
may see and hear over so many television stations. The concentration
of power over program production in the networks has allegedly de-
creased the competitive opportunities of independent producers. The
Commission said that there has been a steady decline in the number
of new programs available for syndication and that financial partici-
pation by the networks in proposed programs is often a decisive factor
in the selection of particular programs.
60 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1965).
61 "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking," Dkt. No. 12782, FCC 65-227, March 22, 1965.
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The proposed rules raise questions at to the scope of the Commis-
sion's regulatory authority. In addition, it remains to be seen whether
the factual assumptions underlying the rules will be supported by the
evidence to be adduced in the current proceeding.
Multiple Ownership Rules
The Commission's multiple ownership rules are intended to pro-
mote diversification in broadcast services and programming and to
prevent undue concentrations of economic power.62 The rules follow
two distinct approaches to this problem. The "concentration of con-
trol" rules place absolute limitations on the ownership of broadcast
facilities. They prohibit the common ownership of more than seven
AM stations, seven FM stations, and seven television stations.63 The
common ownership or control of fewer stations is prohibited if an
undue concentration of control is found to exist in light of such factors
as the size and location of the area served, the number of people served,
the classes of stations involved, and the existence of competition in
the area.
In addition to the "concentration of control" provisions, the
multiple ownership rules are intended to cope with purely local and
regional problems involving an undue concentration of control. Prior
to 1964, the standard broadcast rules prohibited the grant of a license
to any party if
such party directly or indirectly owns, operates or controls another
standard broadcast station, a substantial portion of whose primary
service area would receive primary service from the station in ques-
tion, except upon a showing that public interest, convenience and
necessity will be served through such multiple ownership situation.6 4
In 1964, however, the foregoing rule was amended to prohibit
specific levels of overlapping service. No license may now be granted
to any person who directly or indirectly owns, operates, or controls
one or more AM or FM stations if the grant would result in an overlap
62 The multiple ownership rules apply to all three broadcast services, i.e., AM
radio, FM radio, and television. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1964).
63 No more than five of the seven television stations may be in the VHF band.
The Supreme Court has upheld the Commission's authority to place absolute numerical
limitations on the number of stations which may be owned by one person. United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
64 47 C.F.R. § 73.35(a) (1964). The FM and television rules prohibited the i-
censing of a station which would serve "substantially the same area" as another station
owned or operated by the applicant. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.240(a), 73.636(a) (1964). The FM
and television rules did not contain the built-in waiver provision found in the AM
section. In practice, however, the possibility of a waiver was at least theoretically avail-
able in FM and television cases prior to 1964.
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of the predicted or measured 1 mv/m groundwave contours of the
existing and proposed stations. The new television rule prohibits an
overlap of the Grade B contours of the existing and proposed stations.
The Commission explained its purpose in adopting the new rules
as follows:
The concept embodied in the rules is not complex: When two
stations in the same broadcast service are close enough together
so that a substantial number of people can receive both, it is highly
desirable to have the stations owned by different people. This ob-jective flows logically from two basic principles underlying the mul-
tiple ownership rules. First, in a system of broadcasting based upon
free competition, it is more reasonable to assume that stations owned
by different people will compete with each other, for the same
audience and advertisers, than stations under the control of a single
person or group. Second, the greater the diversity of ownership
in a particular area, the less chance there is that a single person or
group can have "an inordinate effect, in a political, editorial, or
similar programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level."
In this respect, the rules are based upon a view of the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution similar to that of the Supreme Court in
the Associated Press case-i.e., a notion that the Amendment "rests
on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public." 65
The Commission claimed that twenty years of experience with
case-by-case adjudication had proved unsuccessful in preventing local
and regional concentrations of power. The presence of undesirable
overlap had allegedly become only one of a large number of evidentiary
considerations contributing to the ultimate decision. The Commission
concluded that the pattern of grants which had been developed through
case-by-case adjudication did not represent "a desirable realization
of our national multiple ownership policy." It also said that the results
of case-by-case adjudication had not justified the effort expended and
that the new rules would enable applicants to plan their proposals with
a greater degree of foreknowledge of the Commission's requirements.
65 "In the Matter of Amendment of §§ 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Com-
mission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broad-
cast Stations," Dkt. No. 14711, FCC 64-445, June 9, 1964. (Footnotes omitted.) The
1 mv/m contour has generally been regarded as the normally protected contour for
FM stations. For AM stations, unlike FM, the 0- mv/rn contour had long been re-
garded as defining a station's "normally protected service area." Nevertheless, many
applications were granted which resulted in an interference within the 0.5 mv/m
contours. In choosing the Grade B contour to define the prohibited area of overlap
in television service, the Commission said that the Grade B signals provide the only
available service in many areas of the country. Ordinarily, Grade B television signals
can be received only by the use of relatively complex antenna systems.
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Shortly after announcing the new rules, the Commission turned
to a special problem which involves an alleged concentration of control
of VHF television stations. The Commission announced that it would
require hearings on all future applications for a second VHF television
station in any of the fifty "major markets." The Commission pointed
to evidence which indicated that in recent years there has been an
increase in the extent of multiple ownership and that the trend toward
increased concentration of ownership is particularly evident in the
VHF television service. For example, between 1956 and 1964 the num-
ber of multiple television station owners increased from 81 to 134, or
from 23.3 percent to 40.9 percent of all station owners. During the
same period, the number of television stations owned by multiple
owners increased from 203 to 372, or from 43.4 percent to 65.7 percent
of all stations. At the same time, the number of individually owned
stations declined from 265 to 194.
In the ten largest markets, as defined by the American Research
Bureau, there are forty VHF stations, of which thirty-seven are held
by multiple owners, and the remaining three are licensed to companies
which own daily newspapers in the same cities. The Commission con-
cluded:
Briefly, our purpose is to prevent undue concentration of control
in the broadcasting industry, and to encourage the development of
the greatest diversity and variety in the presentation of information,
opinion, and broadcast material generally. In our actions in this
area, we are guided by the Congressional policy against monopoly
in the communications field (e.g., as expressed in Section 313 of the
Communications Act), and the concept (recognized by the Courts)
that the broadcasting business is, and should be, one of free competi-
tion.66
In June, 1965, the Commission instituted formal rule making
proceedings on a proposed amendment to the multiple ownership rule
which would prohibit the common ownership of three television sta-
tions or more than two VHF stations in the fifty largest markets0 7
Commissioner Hyde dissented, calling the Commission's investigation
inadequate. He also challenged the Commission's contention that its
statistics demonstrate a trend toward undue concentration.18
06 "Commission to Designate for Hearing Applications to Acquire Interests in a
Second VHF Station in Major Markets." FCC 64-1171, Dec. 18, 1964.
67 "Interim Policy Concerning Acquisition of Broadcast Stations," Dkt. No. 16068,
FCC 69-548, June 21, 1965.
68 Dissenting statement of Commissioner Hyde, "Interim Policy Concerning Ac-
quisition of Broadcast Stations," Dkt. No. 16068, June 24, 1965.
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CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has said that the broadcast industry
is one of free competition, the industry is not regulated by those com-
petitive forces which the antitrust laws seek to preserve. The Commu-
nications Act provides that the antitrust laws shall be applicable to
practices in the industry. However, the Federal Communications Com-
mission has no direct enforcement authority under the Sherman Act.
Enforcement of the antitrust laws is complicated by the fact that the
Commission's "public interest" standard sometimes produces results
which conflict with antitrust objectives.
Recent developments disclose a trend from adjudication toward
the adoption of per se rules of illegality which are intended to regulate
competition and, in some cases, to limit it. The Commission's adjudi-
cative procedures are admittedly cumbersome. This, however, is a
reason for improving those procedures, not for adopting per se rules
which may result in inequities in individual cases. 69 A number of bills
have been recently introduced in Congress calling for an examination
of the antitrust laws by an independent commission which would
report recommended changes to Congress. 7' The need for a national
policy of competition in the broadcasting industry is clearly a problem
which requires detailed analysis by such an agency.
69 There is currently a trend in certain other federal agencies, such as the Federal
Trade Commission, to abandon adjudication in favor of per se rules. See Elman, "Rule-
making Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law," 78 Harv. L. Rev.
385 (1964).
70 The following bills have been introduced in the 89th Congress: S. 1305, H.R.
1575, H.R. 5303, H.R. 5584, H.R. 5667 1st Sess. (1965). See Address by Commissioner
Jones, International Law Committee of Federal Bar Association, May 18, 1965.
